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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(a), UTAH 
CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues presented in this appeal: 
31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protection. 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection coverage: 
* * * 
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile accident 
occurring . . . while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah 
involving the described motor vehicle. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-308 (1990). 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy 
which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for 
general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an 
automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the 
following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective 
findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may 
only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor 
vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a 
resident family member of the insured and not insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured 
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or 
while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any 
motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to 
any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or 
other hazardous properties of nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be 
contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced 
by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of 
an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar 
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statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from the 
United States or any of its agencies because that person is on active duty in the 
military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, including 
those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by the policy 
insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31 A-22-307 shall be made on 
a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after 
the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses 
incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire 
claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 
30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the 
remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also 
overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear 
interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover 
the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action 
to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the 
following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally liable for 
the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under 
personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer, including the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund created under Chapter 33, the insurer of the 
person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and 
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(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be 
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309 (2000).1 
31A-21-106, Incorporation by reference. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), an insurance policy may not contain 
any agreement or incorporate any provision not fully set forth in the policy or in an 
application or other document attached to and made a part of the policy at the time of 
its delivery, unless the policy, application, or agreement accurately reflects the terms 
of the incorporated agreement, provision, or attached document. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106 (1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: 
Did the Court of Appeals Err by Failing to Give Effect to 
Section 309(4) and by Applying the Inapposite Section 309(6)? 
The dispute between Regal and Canal does not center on the "legal liability" of 
their respective insureds. Instead, the dispute lies in Canal's stubborn coverage 
conclusion and its primary obligation to provide PIP benefits. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other 
policy . . . , primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the 
motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(4). 
1
 Regal has provided the text of section 309 as it exists today. Changes made 
since 1995 were not substantive. 
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Section 309(6)(a), on the other hand, relates to "legal liability" and applies 
where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom 
[PIP] benefits... have been paid by another insurer . . . the 
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(6)(a) (emphasis added). 
And Section 309(6)(b) then mandates arbitration for "the issue of liability for 
that reimbursement...." It does not mandate (or even permit) arbitration for a 
determination of coverage issues or the enforcement of Section 309(4). Therefore, the 
assertion by the Court of Appeals that "of course" the parties can arbitrate simply 
ignores the plain language of the statute in favor of vague and inaccurate 
generalizations. 
Did the Court of Appeals Misinterpret Ivie Based Upon 
an Inaccurate Understanding of the Word 
"Subrogation" and the Scope of "Reimbursement"? 
The Court of Appeals claimed that the "cardinal principle" of Ivie applies to this 
case despite the drastically different facts of this case. See Opinion f 9. The Ivie court 
did not abrogate all rights of subrogation. Instead, it reasoned that equity was not the 
source of the direct right of reimbursement provided by Section 309(6) because the 
insureds into whose "shoes" the PIP carriers would "step" were stripped of their rights 
and obligations. See Allstate Insurance Company v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197,1202-03 
5 
(Utah 1980). 
In other words, equity does not dictate that a PIP carrier may not step into the 
insured's shoes and pursue the insured's negligence claims; instead, the insured has no 
negligence claims and the tortfeasor is not, in fact, a tortfeasor. This is why the Ivie 
court correctly ruled that "Allstate ha[d] no right of subrogation to the recovery of 
Ivie. . . ." 
Did the Court of Appeals Ignore the Practical Effects of 
its Decision? 
Regal and all other secondary PIP carriers will now refuse to provide PIP 
benefits to their insureds. The Court of Appeals made it very clear that Regal should 
have forced Christina Chatwin to spend several years suing Canal over its 
wrongheaded coverage decision before providing her with PIP benefits. See Opinion 
If 11. Compliance with the wishes expressed by the Court of Appeals will be in the 
form of denials by every secondary carrier unless or until the insured has fully 
litigated the primary carrier's denial. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Regal Insurance Co. v. Canal Ins. Co.. 2002 UT App 27, 440 Utah Adv. Rep. 19. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant Canal Insurance Company insured Allen Cermack d/b/a 
KC Trucking and his 1995 Transcraft flatbed semi-trailer. 
2. The insured semi-trailer is a "motor vehicle" as defined by UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-12a-103(4)(a). 
3. Plaintiff Regal Insurance Company insured Christina Chatwin. 
4. On or about November 11,1995 at or about State Street and 1200 North, 
Orem, Utah, Christina Chatwin was a pedestrian who was standing on the curb when 
she was struck by Canal's insured semi-trailer. 
5. Christina Chatwin was injured as a result of the above-described incident 
which "occurred] in Utah [and] involv[ed] [Canal's] insured motor vehicle." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-22-308(3). 
6. Christina Chatwin incurred medical expenses. 
7. Regal paid the PIP benefits (medical expenses) to which Christina Chatwin 
was entitled in the sum of $3,000.00. 
8. Canal, at all times material hereto, insured Christina Chatwin for PIP 
coverage pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-22-308(3), -309(4) because Christina 
Chatwin was a pedestrian who was injured in an accident involving Canal's insured 
motor vehicle. 
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9. Canal's obligation to provide PIP coverage to Christina Chatwin for the 
above-described accident and injuries was primary (and Regal's obligation was 
secondary) pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(4). 
10. Canal was and is required to pay said PIP benefits to its insured, Christina 
Chatwin, within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss 
or expense incurred pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(a). 
11. Christina Chatwin provided reasonable proof of her PIP expenses to 
Canal, by and through her subrogee Regal, on or about July 22, 1997. 
12. The district court properly ordered Canal to pay interest and attorney fees 
to its insured (i.e., her subrogee) because it failed and refused to pay PIP benefits 
when due pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(5)(c)-(d). 
13. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed February 7, 2002 and 
vacated the district court's rulings and judgment. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Christina Chatwin was injured when she was struck (as a pedestrian) by a 
semi-trailer insured by Canal. The district court correctly held that although owners of 
semi-trailers may choose to refrain from purchasing PIP coverage (i.e., opt out) 
pursuant to subsection 302(2), Canal's insured (i.e., the owner of the semi-trailer) 
purchased PIP coverage from Canal (i.e., opted in). Therefore, Canal was obligated to 
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provide PIP benefits to Christina Chatwin. Canal's duty to provide PIP benefits to 
Christina Chatwin arose from the fact that Canal was paid insurance premiums. Canal 
claims that the obligations it undertook in exchange for the insurance premiums were 
limited by a definition clause which, it asserts, extinguished PIP coverage for 
pedestrians injured by the use of the semi-trailer. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Regal had no right to enforce Christina 
Chatwin5s right to recover PIP benefits from Canal. It reasoned that subrogation was 
replaced by intercompany arbitration; therefore, Regal's only remedy was arbitration. 
The truth is that Regal accrued to all the rights of Christina Chatwin, and Regal 
(hereinafter "Christina Chatwin") seeks to enforce her rights under Canal's insurance 
policy. Christina Chatwin does not seek to apportion fault to the person who is or 
would be held legally liable. This is not a negligence case or a case based on 
negligence principles. This case involves a determination of insurance coverage for 
Christina Chatwin. Canal may not rely upon Section 309(6) simply by asserting that, 
under different facts and circumstances, such section is normally applicable as 
between insurers while ignoring that this is a case between Christina Chatwin and her 
PIP carrier — Canal — pursuant to Section 309(4). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PROPERLY PARSING SECTION 309(6) DEMONSTRATES 
WHY IT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The Court of Appeals failed to fully analyze the issues upon which it ruled. The 
court appears to have seen nothing more than the words "insurers/' "arbitration," and 
"subrogation." Because the court skipped to a quick conclusion, it achieved an 
erroneous result. Appellate courts often beg off a full analysis on the basis of, for 
example, a "needless advisory opinion" explanation. This tendency to provide 
conclusions which stem from inadequate analysis leads to Utah's insurance law 
jurisprudence being, at times, random.2 
While this seeming arbitrariness tends to favor insurers in the particular cases, 
insurers end up being on both sides of every debate so a court's misplaced compassion 
in a particular case rarely results in a net-beneficial result. Instead, it tends to create 
2
 See, e.g.. Pollard v. Truck Insurance Exchange. 2001 UT App 120 (holding 
that only the named insured was entitled to Uninsured Motorist benefits, while 
ignoring (1) that the named insured was a corporation, (2) that UM benefits only 
cover "bodily injury," and (3) that a corporation, by definition, cannot suffer bodily 
injury because it is an incorporeal legal fiction. It is highly unlikely that the 
corporation had a meeting of the minds regarding its payment of hundreds or 
thousands of dollars in premiums to protect itself against bodily injury. The court 
could have engaged in a reformation analysis. The court could have engaged in an 
analysis of agency to discover whether the shareholder was acting as the corporation 
and thus entitled to coverage. Instead, the court failed to do anything thereby creating 
an unconscionable result and some very unhelpful precedent.). 
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arbitrary guidelines. The lack of predictability in the law prevents insurers from 
knowing their obligations and results in additional litigation adding new and 
unnecessary costs to be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premiums. The 
simple fact is that next week Regal could be in Canal's position and Canal could be in 
Regal's position. Insurers and insureds are united in their need for predictability. 
Each opinion can form the basis for decades of claims adjusting in reliance upon the 
opinion. The incorrect opinion of the Court of Appeals would cost Regal very little in 
this particular case, but it will cost the industry and the citizens of this state untold 
sums over the course of the next decade. 
Proper legal analysis requires a complete analysis rather than mere assumptions. 
Therefore, Regal will fully explain not only why and how the Court of Appeals erred, 
but also how the entire no-fault statute works so that this Court will not be misled by 
any dazzling-superficiality. 
Section 309(6) creates a remedy which resembles subrogation and is a 
substitute for subrogation. Because it only applies to debates regarding the relative 
fault of the insurers' respective insured, it does not apply where relative fault is not the 
subject matter of the dispute. See Jensen v. Eddv. 514 P.2d 1142,1143 (Utah 1973) 
("If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule does not apply."). The plain 
language of Section 309(6) limits its application. 
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Intercompany arbitration is mandated: 
where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom 
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid 
by another insurer,... the insurer of the person who would be 
held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; 
and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the 
insurers. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-309(6). Apparently, the foregoing has the potential to 
contuse. Therefore, it should be more comprehensible on a clause-by-clause basis. 
a. "where the insured" 
This clause identifies the erstwhile tortfeasor. The person who is later identified 
as the person who "would be" held legally liable for negligence. Note: it does not say 
"the insured vehicle;" rather it identifies the person whose insurance may or may not 
be associated with the vehicle involved in causing the injury. Because liability 
coverage, like PIP coverage, is a floating coverage, the legislature identified the 
would-be tortfeasor himself rather than focusing on insured vehicles. 
These three words indicate the scope of the arbitration provision: "where the 
insured . . . " means that the arbitration clause applies only to the situation 
subsequently described. Regal is not blaming Canal's insured for the injury to Ms. 
12 
Chatwin. Instead, Ms. Chatwin was Canal's insured. The first few words of section 
309(6) reveal the Court of Appeals's error. 
b. "under the policy" 
This clause identifies the erstwhile tortfeasor's insurance policy. The Court 
must understand that status as "insured under the policy" does not relate to the 
insuring clause contained in Section 308 because a person is an insured under Section 
308 only when they are injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle. Instead of 
relating to the no-fault endorsement, this clause's use of "the policy" must refer to 
liability coverage required under Section 303 which compels an insurer to "insure" the 
erstwhile tortfeasor "using" a motor vehicle which was "involved" in the accident. 
c. "is or would be held legally liable" 
This clause recognizes both the no-fault immunity and the tort threshold of 
Section 309(1). If the tortfeasor is held legally liable in an action between the victim 
and the tortfeasor, such a finding would be analyzed under principles of issue 
preclusion in intercompany arbitration; therefore, the legislature used the present tense 
of the verb "to be" ("is") followed by the disjunctive conjunction "or." 
However, where the insured retains immunity, the conditional tense "would be" 
is appropriate because it sets forth a condition which is contrary to fact. The insured 
tortfeasor is immune from suit regardless of his insurer's obligation of direct 
13 
reimbursement. The erstwhile tortfeasor is in no sense liable for payment of PIP 
expenses, thus his or her liability coverage does not apply to the liability carrier's 
direct right of reimbursement. This is true even though tort principles are tangentially 
involved and even though the insurer who owes reimbursement under Section 309 
must be identified pursuant to Section 303. 
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court expressed surprise that insurers believed prior 
to Allstate v. Ivie that intercompany reimbursement was a "subrogation" principle. 
See Simonson v. Travis. 728 P.2d 999, 1001 (Utah 1986) ("Apparently before this 
Court decided [Ivie ], the concept prevailed that a no-fault carrier had subrogation 
rights against the liability insurance carrier of the driver at fault."). This Court must 
understand that the concept still prevails because of PIP carriers' misunderstanding of 
the interplay between liability coverage and PIP coverage. It is not that insurers, like 
the Court of Appeals, are unwilling to recite the anti-subrogation mantra. Rather, the 
hollowness of the words fail to communicate any understanding. 
The prevailing attitude in intercompany arbitration is that if PIP expenses are 
simply labeled "not reasonable and necessary," then those expenses are not 
recoverable. The justification for the failure of recovery is that the PIP carrier that 
paid the "not reasonable and necessary" PIP benefits to its insured "should not have 
paid those expenses." Therefore, claims adjustors are trained in the unsupervised 
14 
forum that their employers "should not pay" PIP benefits that might be challenged in 
intercompany arbitration as "not reasonable and necessary" expenses. This idea is an 
apocryphal off-shoot of the "voluntary"3 component of subrogation. See part e, infra. 
The "voluntariness" confusion is exacerbated again by additional 
poorly-understood "subrogation" ideas which lead some insurers to believe that the 
tortfeasor's liability coverage-limit restricts intercompany reimbursement obligations. 
These insurers ignore the fact that their insureds are immune from suit for the adverse 
carrier's PIP expenses. Therefore, liability coverage is not triggered and cannot form 
the basis for the insurer's obligation to reimburse the insurer of the victim. The risk 
clause of liability coverage promises indemnification for the sums the insured is 
"legally obligated to pay." Because the erstwhile tortfeasor cannot be "legally 
obligated to pay," the liability coverage is not triggered and, therefore, the coverage 
limits of that coverage cannot affect the insurer's direct obligation to reimburse the 
3
 This means that public policy favors both the payment of some 
undeserving insureds and the overpayment of some disputed claims. 
One support for this public policy norm is the desire to encourage the 
insurance industry to finance losses. This aspect of the public will 
requires that insurers be permitted to recover by subrogation 
colorable claims paid, even if, in the end, these claims were not, strictly 
speaking covered. 
74 Tex. L. Rev. 1361, Quinn, Michael Sean (reviewing Subrogation. Restitution, and 
Indemnification The Law of Subrogation. Mitchell, Charles (Oxford University Press 
1994)). 
15 
other insurer. 
Ivie recognized the distinction between liability coverage and PIP coverage. Its 
conclusions were well-founded. The decision's apparent shortcoming is its implied 
assumption that the readers of the decision would have the same base level of 
understanding the members of that Court had. 
Ivie held that Allstate's attempt to recover its expenses from its insured's 
recovery from the tortfeasor's insurer under its liability coverage was wrongheaded. 
Because Ivie's recovery consisted of the amount of the tortfeasor's legal liability and 
because the tortfeasor's legal liability did not include the PIP expenses incurred by 
Allstate, Allstate's assertion that Ivie recovered its expenses was declared to be 
incorrect. 
Moreover, because the erstwhile tortfeasor is not legally liable, an insurer which 
"steps in the shoes" of the tortfeasor is likewise immune from any subrogation action 
brought by the insurer of the victim which "steps in the shoes" of the victim whose 
rights were abrogated. Thus, the right of subrogation was not directly abrogated as the 
Court of Appeals and Tracy R. Barrus seem to believe. Instead, the right of 
subrogation was, in military parlance, collateral damage. The particular remedy was 
undermined rather than being abrogated. Subrogation's demise, in the narrow sense it 
was eliminated, was a secondary effect because its underpinnings were eliminated — 
16 
not because the insurer of an injured person is "not subrogated" to the rights of the 
injured party. Opinion at f 7. 
d. "for the personal injuries sustained by any person" 
This clause relates to the injuries sustained by the person identified in the 
insuring clause — Section 308 — which "involved" a motor vehicle. 
e. "to whom benefits required under personal injury 
protection" 
This clause identifies the expenses which are recoverable in arbitration. For 
example, some insurers fail to conduct an analysis of the "reasonable value" of certain 
medical expenses under the Relative Value Study. The amounts paid in excess of the 
"reasonable value" are not recoverable because they are not benefits "required" under 
PIP coverage. The ability to deny reimbursement for expenses which were not 
"required" should not be confused with unlawful tort defenses which are raised as a 
result of industry confusion and vague assertions. See part c, supra. 
Likewise, the amounts in excess of the minimum statutory coverage limits 
should be excluded from 309(6) arbitration under the above-quoted language because 
they are not "required" benefits. Those amounts may be recoverable, but they are 
recoverable under subrogation principles from the tortfeasor's liability coverage. This 
is true because the insured tortfeasor is not immune from suit for special damages in 
excess of the tort threshold. Moreover, the injured victim's right to recover special 
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damages from the tortfeasor was not abrogated by the no-fault statute. Therefore, PIP 
carriers that offer increased limits (above $3,000) do so with the understanding that 
recovery of such excess PIP-type expenses may be barred by its insured's exhaustion 
of the tortfeasor's liability coverage limits and are only recoverable under traditional 
subrogation principles. 
f. "have been paid by another insurer" 
By installing this clause, the legislature encouraged insurers to immediately 
"pay" PIP benefits because payment is a condition precedent to the right of 
reimbursement. See, e.g.. Regal Insurance Co. v. Bott 2001 UT 71 at f 11, 31 P.3d 
524 ("PIP benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation without having to 
bring a lawsuit for out-of-pocket expenses "). This principle is similar to 
"indemnity against loss" under the common law. It also limits participation in the 
intercompany reimbursement mechanism to "insurers." 
g, "the insurer of the person who would be held legally 
liable" 
This clause must be reconciled with the clauses analyzed above in sections (a), 
(b), and (c). As alluded to above, the insurer of the erstwhile tortfeasor must be 
identified from the liability coverage on the vehicle even though the liability coverage 
is not the source of the insurer's direct duty to reimburse the other PIP carrier. 
Canal is not alleged to be "the insurer of the person who would be held legally 
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liable." Canal is alleged to be the primary PIP carrier for Christina Chatwin. Again, 
because Section 309(6) does not apply to this case, it cannot limit Regal's rights. 
h. "shall reimburse the other insurer for the payment" 
This clause provides a clear requirement that one insurer "shall" be responsible 
for PIP expenses incurred by the insurer of the less-culpable party. It also makes clear 
that the obligation to pay is a direct obligation rather than a contractual obligation to 
answer for the legal liability of the insured tortfeasor. 
Imagine a scenario where the tortfeasor carries insurance with minimum 
coverage limits. An injured victim may receive up to $23,300.00 under his or her PIP 
coverage. If the injured insured obtains reimbursement from his or her own PIP 
carrier which approaches the tort threshold, the PIP carrier for the victim knows the 
tortfeasor's coverage limits and incorrectly believes that it will not be able to recover 
any of its PIP expenses from the liability carrier for the erstwhile tortfeasor because of 
the tortfeasor's low coverage limits which will probably be exhausted by the victim 
may attack its own insured through tort defenses and "independent" reviews of 
medical treatment. Under this mistaken belief of "subrogation" (which insurers are 
willing to characterize as "reimbursement" while employing subrogation principles), 
the insurer of the victim often denies PIP coverage to the victim and attempts to 
interfere with its insured's medical treatment in order to preserve the liability carrier's 
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coverage limits for its own reimbursement.4 When this intimidation occurs, the PIP 
carrier always wins the war which should never be fought. There is no need, as a 
matter of law, for PIP carriers to be concerned with the tortfeasor's coverage limits 
because the duty to reimburse is a direct, statutory duty arising from the issuance of 
PIP coverage. 
The reality is that PIP carriers refuse to pay PIP benefits to their insureds 
because the intercompany arbitration system refuses to provide the remedy mandated 
by the legislature and the Court system is impotent to force them to act properly. 
Similarly, secondary PIP carriers will take advantage of the Court of Appeals's refusal 
to implement the legislature's intent unless this Court provides proper guidance. 
In addition to injuring already-injured insureds, the foregoing practices distort 
insurance premiums. By way of example, if one assumes that the insureds of high-risk 
carriers are more likely to be the tortfeasors and insureds of preferred carriers are more 
likely to be the victims, one may understand the effect of these bad procedures on the 
insurance industry. If high-risk carriers can limit their total exposure to a $25,000 
liability coverage limit by insisting that the PIP reimbursement obligation is subsumed 
by the liability coverage limitation, high-risk carriers can thereby shift the exposure to 
4
 This is probably why Professor Keeton, in his seminal 1973 law review 
article analyzing Utah's no-fault statute, considered the retention of fault to be ill-
conceived. 
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the preferred carriers who insure the victims. Because the preferred carriers cannot 
recover their PIP expenses, they are required to pass those costs on to their insureds. 
High-risk carriers can pass on the savings of being protected from their direct 
obligations. These circumstances result in distorted premium assessments and force 
good drivers to subsidize the insurance premiums of less-cautious drivers. 
i. "but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable" 
This clause is the source of a lot of confusion. Recoverable by whom? 
Recoverable how? Recoverable under what rules? The best explanation is that 
because intercompany arbitration is a substitute for subrogation and seeks to determine 
"legal liability," the arbitration follows the tort process. This conclusion is supported 
by Section 309(6)(b) as explained below. 
j . "that the issue of liability for that reimbursement 
and its amount" 
This clause answers the question of the amount "recoverable" by the insurer of 
the victim. The amount recoverable is determined according to tort principles. The 
PIP carriers must pay PIP benefits to their insureds according to the contract which 
vests discretion in the insureds and does not permit tort defenses5 such as "reasonable 
5
 We reject C.T.'s argument that the Personal Injury 
Payment ("PIP") made by his own insurer establishes the 
threshold amount for his medical expenses [pursuant to 
subsection 309(1)]. The mere fact that his PIP insurer paid 
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and necessary," "caused by," "related to," or "pre-existing condition." However, the 
insurer's right of reimbursement from the other insurer is subject to tort principles. 
This means that the insurers may challenge the comparative fault of their respective 
insureds, the proximate causation of injuries claimed to have been suffered as a result 
of the accident, and the amount of injuries and damages which would have been 
recoverable in a tort case. Frequently, insurers wait for the tort litigation of the 
underlying claims in order to determine (under issue preclusion principles) the amount 
which is or would be owed by the tortfeasor to the victim. In fact, many insurers are 
signatories to intercompany arbitration agreements which require all signatories to 
await the outcome of the underlying tort litigation. That agreement, to which Regal is 
a signatory, is not applicable to this case because Canal is not a signatory. 
k. "shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers9' 
This clause recognizes that the adoption of tort principles could clog the court 
system by presenting manifold tort defenses. It would make no sense to do away with 
for medical expenses which the jury found were not 
related to the accident should not be binding on Johnson 
for purposes of establishing the medical expenses threshold 
and exposing Johnson to liability for general damages. 
This is especially so since a PIP carrier has a first party 
contractual relationship with its insured — in this case C.T. 
— and owes certain duties to him. 
C.T. v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479 at n.3. 
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tort defenses for the insureds relating to the receipt of PIP benefits while maintaining 
the same standards and corresponding volume of litigation between insurers. Much of 
the cost advantages of the partial replacement for the tort system would be eliminated 
by the subsequent infighting between insurers. This situation would be inconsistent 
with the purpose of a no-fault system. Instead of providing insurers with a 
subrogation right in the court system, the legislature provided a similar remedy while 
simultaneously providing a forum where simplicity could reign. 
II. CANAL'S PIP COVERAGE OBLIGATION IS PRIMARY; 
THEREFORE, REGAL IS SUBROGATED TO CHATWIN'S 
RIGHTS TO RECEIVE PIP BENEFITS FROM CANAL. 
The dispute between Regal and Canal does not center on the "legal liability" of 
their respective insureds which is the focus of the intercompany arbitration clause. 
Instead, the dispute lies in Canal's stubborn coverage conclusion and its primary 
obligation to provide PIP benefits which is the subject of the other insurance clause. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other 
policy . . . , primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the 
motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(4). 
The question of whether subrogation exists with respect to this clause does not 
depend on some vague assertions made in some law student's review of a somewhat 
inapposite legal opinion. Instead, the analysis revolves around the rights possessed by 
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the alleged subrogee and necessarily includes an analysis of the rights possessed by 
the alleged subrogor. See generally Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel 2002 UT 62 
at f 22 ("The insurer succeeds to the insured's cause of action against a responsible 
third party."). Accordingly, the focus by the Court of Appeals on the actions of 
Christina Chatwin rather than her rights against Canal was error. 
It is undisputed that Christina Chatwin was injured by the semi-trailer which 
was insured by Canal. Therefore, it is undiputed that Canal's coverage6 was primary. 
Because Canal has a statutory obligation to Christina Chatwin, she possesses the right 
to obtain PIP benefits from Canal. Because her rights are not abrogated or voided by 
virtue of RegaPs payment, Regal now possesses those rights. Because Regal now 
possesses Christina Chatwin's rights, Regal may enforce those rights. 
III. INTER-COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT AND THE 
MANDATORY, BINDING ARBITRATION MECHANISM 
ARE DESIGNED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE RIGHT OF 
SUBROGATION WHICH WAS EXTINGUISHED BY THE 
NO-FAULT STATUTE. 
This case does not involve a determination of which insurance company's 
insured is liable (or comparatively more liable). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-
6
 Because this Court only reviews the Opinion of the Court of Appeals rather 
than the ruling of the district court, the coverage obligation of Canal is undisputed. 
Regal notes that the district court's opinion would be settled under principles of issue 
preclusion if the parties were to return to arbitration. 
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309(6)(b). This case is a coverage dispute. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997). 
This case involves a determination of coverage obligations undertaken by two 
insurance companies. This case does not involve the issue of legal liability. See, e.g.. 
Meadow Vallev Contractors v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.. 2001 UT App 190 at fflf 12-
15, 423 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (explaining the trigger-of-coverage "arising out o f and 
comparing it to the trigger-of-coverage "legal liability"). It involves Canal's refusal to 
provide PIP benefits for its insured. 
Because Canal is Christina Chatwin's insurance company, she may apply to 
Canal for PIP benefits and enforce all of her rights set forth in the no-fault statute. 
Christina Chatwin's rights are not extinguished by the fact that Regal has paid the 
benefits which were due her. See, e^., State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. 
Northwestern National Ins. Co.. 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996): see also DuBois v. Nve. 
584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) ("The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer 
is not entitled to have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the 
plaintiff has received or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an 
independent collateral source."). 
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IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ARE 
MANDATORY. 
Attorney fees and prejudgment interest at the rate of 1 Vz% per month are 
provided for in the no-fault statute. These sections are mandatory in order to avoid 
undermining the legislative goal that PIP benefits be paid to insureds "immediate[ly]. 
. . without having to bring a lawsuit." Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 
865 (Utah 1992). 
Because Canal refused to pay the PIP benefits it owed to Christina Chatwin, 
Regal was forced to initiate litigation, and Canal is obligated to pay the penalties7 set 
forth in the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-
22-309(5)(c)-(d). Timely payment of PIP benefits, and the concomitant obligation to 
pay the statutory penalties, is not permissive; rather both obligations are mandatory as 
evidenced by the language employed by the legislature. 
(c) . . . these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Vi% per 
month after the due date. 
(d) . . . the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's 
fee to the claimant. 
7
 See also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 
1997) ("Where an insurer wrongfully refuses to provide a defense, it 'is manifestly 
bound to reimburse its insured for the full amount of any obligation reasonably 
incurred by him. . . . If there be uncertainty as to the nature or extent of the services 
reasonably to be rendered by counsel engaged by the insured, that uncertainty must 
be resolved against [the] insurer"). 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(5)(c)-(d) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that courts have no discretion when the legislature adopts 
such "mandatory" language. 
We are guided in construing the language of the instant statute by 
the principle that generally a direction in a statute to do an act is 
considered 'mandatory' when consequences are attached to the 
failure to act. Conversely, when a statute requires an action to be 
taken without prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, the 
requirement is not often deemed mandatory. 
Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). 
The Opinion insisted that "Canal cannot be punished for failure to make 
payment on a nonexistent claim." Opinion at f 10. Because the Court of Appeals 
erred in its assumption that Regal could not step in the shoes of Chatwin, its initial 
mistake was compounded when it assumed that Regal's actions in submitting notice 
and proof of her claim did not constitute a claim. Once it is acknowledged by this 
Court that Regal was entitled to pursue Chatwin's rights, the Court of Appeals's 
Opinion is easily dismissed as arising from a false premise. Id at f 12. 
V. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL ATTORNEY 
FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED ON THIS 
APPEAL. 
Appellate courts routinely allow attorney fees on appeal when contracts and/or 
statutes expressly provide for fees. See Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219,227 (Utah 
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App. 1991). Plaintiff is entitled, and hereby demands, to recover its attorney fees 
expended for this appeal, and each part of it. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Regal was properly awarded a summary judgment regarding Canal's 
obligation to provide PIP benefits to Regal as the subrogee of Chrstina Chatwin. In 
addition, accrued interest and Regal's attorney fees were properly awarded because 
they are provided for in the Utah no-fault statute and are supported by admissible 
evidence submitted to the district court. Judgment entered against Canal should be 
enforced, and attorney fees incurred in connection with this appeal should be awarded. 
DATED this / / day of July, 2002. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
r ^ — 
V^ TgENTj. WADDOUBS^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellee 
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BENCH, Judge: 
H1 Defendant Canal Insurance Company (Canal) appeals from a 
summary judgment ruling in favor of Plaintiff Regal Insurance 
Company (Regal). The trial court awarded Regal reimbursement of 
personal-injury-protection benefits (PIP benefits), costs, 
prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. We vacate the award and 
remand. 
BACKGROUND 
H2 In 1995, Donald Boyet borrowed 
owned by KC Trucking and attached i 
and operated by Kelly Devey. While 
with Boyet's tractor, Devey struck 
Chatwin. After receiving medical t 
by the collision, Chatwin submitted 
her own automobile insurance carrie 
the PIP benefit limit of $3,000 for 
a flatbed tractor trailer 
t to a tractor owned by Boyet 
pulling the borrowed trailer 
a pedestrian, Christina 
reatment for injuries caused 
a claim for PIP benefits to 
r, Regal. Regal paid Chatwin 
her medical expenses. 
1[3 Regal subsequently contacted Canal, the insurance carrier 
for KC Trucking, and requested reimbursement for the $3,000 PIP 
benefits paid to Chatwin. Canal refused Regal]s request for 
reimbursement after concluding that 1) the trailer is not covered 
under a personal-injury-protection endorsement (PIP Endorsement) 
of the automobile insurance policy issued by Canal to KC 
Trucking; and 2) even if the trailer is covered under the PIP 
Endorsement, Regal must pursue a claim for reimbursement through 
arbitration. Rather than submit to arbitration, Regal filed suit 
against Canal, claiming that Canal breached its insurance 
contract by refusing "to pay PIP benefits to Christina Chatwin, 
or to [Regal] as her subrogee." In addition to seeking $3,000 in 
damages plus costs, Regal also sought prejudgment interest and 
attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(c) to (d) 
(1999) . 
f4 After considering cross motions for summary judgment, the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Regal. The 
trial court rejected Canal's arbitration argument in its final 
order and concluded in a minute entry that Chatwin was covered as 
an "eligible injured person" under Canal's PIP Endorsement. The 
trial court awarded Regal $3,000 for the PIP benefits it had paid 
Chatwin, plus costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. 
Canal appeals the trial court's ruling. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
|5 On appeal, we consider two issues. First, Canal asserts 
that the trial court erred in not requiring Regal to pursue its 
claims through mandatory arbitration under section 31A-22-309(6). 
Second, Canal contends that the trial court erred in awarding 
Regal attorney fees and prejudgment interest under section 31A-
22-309(5). Resolution of these issues is a matter of statutory 
construction. "Matters of statutory construction are questions 
of law that are reviewed for correctness." Platts v. Parents 
Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
%6 This case turns on section 31A-22-309(6), which provides: 
Every policy providing personal injury 
protection coverage is subject to the 
following: 
(a) that where the insured under the 
policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury 
protection have been paid by another 
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insurer . . . the insurer of the person 
who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the amount 
of damages recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amount shall be 
decided by mandatory, binding 
arbitration between the insurers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6). Regal claims that, as Chatwin's 
subrogee, it may assert a contractual cause of action against 
Canal regarding Canal's obligation to provide PIP benefits to 
Chatwin. 
i|7 Regal' s argument fails because, with regard to the pay lent 
of PIP benefits, it is not subrogated to the rights of Chatwin. 
The Utah Supreme Court settled this issue in Allstate Insurance 
Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). In that case, Ivie was a 
passenger in a vehicle insured by Allstate when it was involved 
in an accident with another vehicle. See id. at 1198. Allstate 
paid Ivie PIP benefits for injuries suffered in the accident. 
See id. Ivie subsequently settled a lawsuit that she had filed 
against the insurer of the other vehicle involved in the 
accident. See id. Ivie refused to reimburse Allstate out of the 
settlement proceeds, so Allstate filed suit against Ivie. See 
id. Allstate asserted that "it was entitled to subrogation under 
the contractual terms of the policy issued on the vehicle in 
which Ivie was a passenger to the extent it had paid the PIP 
benefits. fl Id. 
^8 Resolution of the dispute in Ivie required the supreme court 
to interpret the same statutory provision at issue in this case.1 
See id. at 1201-02. The court concluded that Allstate was not 
subrogated to Ivie's rights, but rather that it had a "limited, 
equitable right to seek reimbursement [of PIP benefits] in 
arbitration." Id. at 1202; see also Tracy R. Barrus, Comment, 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers 
Under Utah's No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379, 384 ("The 
court's interpretation of [section 31A-22-309(6)] in Ivie 
clarified [that] . . . the reimbursement provision supplants 
subrogation procedures that existed prior to the no-fault act. 
It is now clear that the no-fault insurer is not subrogated to 
the right of its insured."). 
1. Section 31A-22-309 (6) "differs slightly from [the statute at 
issue in Ivie] in wording but not in substance." Bear River Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33,^2 n.2, 978 P.2d 460. 
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H9 Although the posture of the present case differs from Ivie, 
Ivie!s cardinal principle still applies: for PIP benefits, 
subrogation has been replaced with reimbursement obtained through 
arbitration. See Ivie, 606 P.2d at 1204 (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (stating that the insured and the insurer must each 
pursue their own remedy, and the insurer's remedy is achieved 
through arbitration); Barrus, supra, at 388 ("As the court 
recognized, the thrust of [section 31A-22-309(6)] is to abrogate 
subrogation in the no-fault context and replace it with a system 
of reimbursement between insurers."). We therefore conclude that 
this dispute may only be resolved through arbitration. It 
follows that Regal is not entitled to an award for its litigation 
costs. 
UlO Finally, we address the trial court's award of prejudgment 
interest and attorney fees to Regal. Section 31A-22-309(5) 
allows an injured person to seek prejudgment interest and 
attorney fees if an insurer fails to timely pay PIP benefits. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(d) (providing that attorney 
fees are available to the person entitled to the PIP benefits). 
Here, the person entitled to PIP benefits, Chatwin, never 
submitted a claim as a pedestrian for those benefits to Canal, as 
allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308 (1999) .2 Instead, 
Chatwin, as the named insured in her own automobile insurance 
policy, chose to submit her PIP benefit claim to Regal, as 
allowed under section 31A-22-308(1). Thus, Canal cannot be 
punished for failure to make payment on a nonexistent claim. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(b) ("Benefits . . . are overdue if 
they are not paid within 3 0 days after the insurer receives 
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred 
during the period."). 
1Jll Even if Chatwin had submitted a PIP benefit claim to Canal 
as a pedestrian under section 31A-22-308(3), it would be 
2. Section 31A-22-308 provides, in part: 
The following may receive benefits under 
personal injury protection coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in 
an accident involving any motor vehicle 
(3) any other natural person whose 
injuries arise out of an automobile 
accident occurring . . . while a 
pedestrian if he is injured in an 
accident occurring in Utah involving the 
described motor vehicle. 
Id. § 31A-22-308 (1) , (3) . 
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Chatwin's personal remedy, as the person entitled to PIP 
benefits, to pursue an action against Canal for prejudgment 
interest and attorney fees under section 31A-22-309 (5) . Regal 
could not bring a subrogation suit seeking those penalties 
because, as discussed above, Regal is not subrogated to Chatwin's 
rights. See Ivie# 606 P.2d at 1202. Rather, Regal has a limited 
remedy of seeking reimbursement for paid PIP benefits in 
arbitration proceedings under section 31A-22-309(6). The 
prejudgment interest and attorney fees provisions of section 31A-
22-309(5) are therefore inapplicable in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
^12 Regal may not pursue a subrogation suit against Canal for 
the $3,000 in PIP benefits Regal paid to Chatwin. Regal may, of 
course, seek reimbursement of the PIP benefits in arbitration 
proceedings. Because this dispute properly belongs in 
arbitration, Regal is not entitled to an award for litigation 
costs. Finally, the prejudgment interest and attorney fees 
provisions of section 31A-22-309(5) do not apply. 
Ul3 Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's award of $3,000 in 
PIP benefits, costs, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and 
remand to the trial court with instructions to dismiss this 
action. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Hl4 WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 990904421 
vs. : 
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. ; 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on December 
21, 2000. Having reviewed the Memoranda of the parties and 
considered the arguments presented by counsel, I conclude that 
Regal's insured, Miss Chatwin, was the first party insured under 
Canal's policy with K.C. Trucking. I further conclude that her 
status as an "eligible injured person" as defined in the Personal 
Injury Protection Coverage section of the Canal policy is not 
affected by the definition of "insured motor vehicle." 
Canal contends that the trailer which it insured under its 
policy is not an insured motor vehicle for the purposes of personal 
injury protection coverage because to satisfy that definition the 
named insured is required to maintain security under the provisions 
of Title 31A, Utah Code Ann., and no such requirement can be found 
REGAL INSURANCE 
V. CANAL INSURANCE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
in that Title. I agree with Regal' s contention that this provision 
falls within the reach of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in 
Cullum v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993), 
specifically, its interpretation of Utah Code Ann., Section 31A-21-
106, which bars the incorporation by reference of provisions not 
appearing in the contract of insurance. The Cullum court rejected 
an attempt to incorporate a "step-down" clause by reference. If an 
attempt to reduce coverage by incorporation violates the 
prohibitions of Section 31A-21-106, so must an attempt to exclude 
coverage through incorporation. 
Regal's contention that incorporation provisions have no 
relevance in this setting because the person in the position of 
Miss Chatwin would never have occasion to review the insurance 
policy is also unavailing. In Cullum, the court rejected a similar 
argument under facts in which the issue concerning the amount of 
coverage available to a permissive user of an automobile, a person 
who, like Miss Chatwin, would not be expected to inspect the 
insurance policy before operating the vehicle. 
At oral argument, counsel for Regal indicated that although 
the amount at issue in this action was originally $3,000, 
plaintiff's prosecution of the action was motivated, at least in 
part, by desire to recover attorney's fees. Although not now 
before me, I note that with respect to attorney's fees it is my 
REGAL INSURANCE 
V. CANAL INSURANCE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
intention to reject any application for an award of fees for work 
performed in connection with the cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
which culminated in my Minute Entry of May 31, 2000. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. 
Dated this ^ day of January, 2001. 
RONALD' 
DISTRI 
REGAL INSURANCE 
V. CANAL INSURANCE PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
o 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this L— day of 
,--2-trOT7: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 E. Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2235 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REGAL INSURANCE COMPANY, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. SS0904421 
vs. : 
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, : 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff's Application for Attorney's Fees was presented to 
me for decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on January 25, 
2001. I reject Canal's contention that this matter is subject to 
the binding arbitration provision of Section 31A-22-309 (6), Utah 
Code Ann. This section begins with the introductory language, 
"every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the following." This lawsuit concerns the threshold 
question of whether the Canal policy provided coverage.-- It does 
not concern allocation of fault issues which are the subject of the 
inter-party arbitration scheme contemplated in this section. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest in 
the amount of $2,606.54. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. I stand by the observation made in my Minute 
Entry of January 2, 2 001 that attorney's fees would not be awarded 
for work performed in connection with cross-Motions for Summary 
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Judgment decided in my Minute Entry of May 31, 2 0 00. An award of 
fees for work performed in connection with these Motions would not 
be reasonable because the arguments advanced in the motions 
overlooked Utah law which squarely addressed and disposed of the 
issues raised. From time to time while engaged in the practice of 
law, I ruminated at length over questions which, had I troubled to 
look, I would have discovered had been answered by the legislature 
in the Utah Code. These are unfortunate and understandable 
occurrence, but I decline to reward them with awards of attorneys 
fees. 
I find that plaintiff's counsel reasonably expended 24.6 hours 
of work on this matter. Although plaintiff's Application for Fees 
contains no information concerning the training and experience of 
plaintiff's counsel, I nevertheless conclude that plaintiff's 
proposed per hour fee of $150 is reasonable. Accordingly, I award 
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,690. Lastly, plaintiff is 
entitled to recover costs in the amount of $273.46. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare an Order and Judgment 
consistent with this Minute Entry. 
Dated this ]$ _day of February, 2001. 
RONALD E. NEHRING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this day of 
February, 2 001; 
Trent J. Waddoups 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 E. Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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